Shell CO 2 Storage B.V. (SCS) is planning for the injection of some 10 million tonnes of CO 2 in two depleted gas fields Barendrecht (BRT) and Barendrecht-Ziedewij (BRTZ). The project will be the first Dutch onshore injection project and can be regarded as a demonstration project to show that a framework is in place before implementing larger future sequestration projects. The primary focus of the subsurface study was to demonstrate containment of the CO 2 . A safety management plan on possible leakage from the containment was written, which documents possible physical and chemical threats, various barriers that are in place, probability and impact of leakage scenarios and a monitoring, prevention and response plan. It is demonstrated that no medium and high risk leakage scenarios have been identified in both the injection phase and post abandonment phase. Mitigating actions lead to a reduction of the "low" risk scenarios to a "negligible" status.
Introduction
Risks and uncertainties are frequently being quantified using a quantitative risk assessment (QRA) approach. The standard safety QRA describes the possible risk scenarios that ultimately lead to lethal consequences. In general, a QRA is only needed when a risk scenario with possible health, safety and environmental (HSE) consequences can be defined. The first principle of containment demonstration is therefore the assessment of possible migration and leakage scenarios that results in HSE consequences. Therefore, we developed a dedicated step-based risk assessment and risk management approach for the Barendrecht (BRT) and Barendrecht-Ziedewij (BRTZ) proposed storage of CO 2 to demonstrate subsurface containment in the subsurface.
Together with the Netherlands Institute of Applied Research, TNO, we performed an investigation to the potential leakage scenarios. A quantitative calculation (the amount of leaked CO 2 and the possible consequence) is then only needed for those scenarios where a non-negligible safety risk can be identified. These observations formed the basis of this approach, which is consistent with approaches recently published in [ 1 ] and [ 2 ] .
Project risks versus 'leakage' risks
Any industrial project will face certain risks like financial and HSE risks. In the case of possible CO 2 leakage we mostly refer to HSE risks but the ultimate impact of higher concentrations of CO 2 on health and environment is a topic of much debate. For the Barendrecht project the aim is to demonstrate containment in the subsurface making further discussions on impact from possible subsurface leakage obsolete. To avoid a discussion on what the definition is of the subsurface "container" we will discriminate here between the terms leakage and migration of CO 2 . Migration means escaped CO 2 from the storage reservoir but moving or trapped within the subsurface. Leakage is migrated CO 2 that leaks into the biosphere. The risk scenarios explained in this paper are called leakage scenarios because the aim of the risk management plan is an assessment on the possible escape of CO 2 into the biosphere.
The identification and description of leakage scenarios are especially important in 'new' applications of CO 2 injection. Once identified, a quantitative estimate of the consequence of the leak scenario (the amount of leaked CO 2 and the possible consequence) can be calculated but this in only needed for those scenarios where a health, safety, environmental or economical risk can be identified.
A life cycle framework is adopted for the project that is not very different from a 'standard' oil-and gas project framework except for the fact that geological containment is the main driver for the project rather than production. To structure the risk management process it was decided to follow a step-based approach. The steps presented in this abstract summarize the step-based approach that is fully documented in [ 4 ] . The approach agrees with standards as proposed by ISO/FDIS 31000:2900 [ 5 ] . A description of these steps is presented below.
Step 1: site selection from the available fields This step evaluates the possible fields that are available for CO 2 sequestration. Site selection is also a common first step in the literature on CO 2 sequestration risk management. Lists of risk factors have been documented (e.g. [ 6 ] ) that facilitates the choice of the correct candidate. The reality however is that in many cases only a few candidate fields are timely available after the first assessment. Besides containment risk factors or threats also other critical factors like economical factors (e.g. distance to source) and legal issues control the selection of a specific site. Furthermore, not only subsurface threats need to be addressed but also surface risk factors coming from, for example, CO 2 transport need to be incorporated in the field selection phase. Finally, a governmental tender procedure prescribed that only onshore fields could be selected. The primary field that was chosen was the 'de Lier field' but, based on the feasibility studies. This field was rejected because of low to medium leakage risks by those abandoned wells that could not be accessed anymore under the conditions of stored CO 2 just below initial reservoir pressure. The second candidate having a fair distance to the CO 2 source (Pernis refinery) and the correct storage capacity was the combination of the BRT and BRTZ fields.
Step 2: Inventory of relevant threats and leakage scenarios. A brainstorm session was held with internal and external experts. It was also tried during this session to identify the threats that form cause-consequences relations. Cause-consequence relations could hence be placed into a scenario like for instance the well leakage scenario. TNO's FEP database [ 7 ] has been used to facilitate this first assessment and was also used as check whether threats were overlooked during the brainstorm session. The selected FEPs or threats have been visualized in a relational (cause-consequence) bow-tie diagram (see step 4 for further explanation). These threats form the basis for the feasibility study or threat assessment.
Step 3: Feasibility study and threat assessment A series of technical studies have been defined based on the threats and leakage scenarios that were identified in step 2. These studies result in a detailed assessment and description of the most relevant threats for CO 2 migration and leakage. Studies were executed by both TNO and Shell. Although the description of this step is quite short, the step itself took the most time and effort in the whole process. To illustrate this; the EIA [ 3 ] reference documents consist of more than 1000 pages.
Step 4: Semi quantitative ranking of the threats and leakage scenarios The investigated threats and leakage scenarios were discussed in a second workshop and impact and probability was assigned to the threats that resulted in low, medium and high risk threats. The threats were mapped in a 'bow-tie' structure. In summary: the 'bow-tie' method is a popular risk management technique, so called because it describes the management of risk in the shape of a bow-tie. The method visualizes the linkage between the risks and risk controls i.e. the risk management system. The method facilitates also in communicating risk issues to non-specialists [ 9 ] . The main elements of the bow-tie method are outlined in Figure 1 . The hazard in this project is: sequestered CO 2 under relative buoyant conditions and the top event is the migration of CO 2 out of the containment of the target storage reservoir. Note that the hazard is NOT 'CO 2 under pressure' as the average field pressure of CO 2 during and at the end of the injection period is lower than the water pressure in the surrounding formations. This means that the pressure gradient in our case is pointing towards the reservoir rather than outwards as is the case in aquifer storage. The leakage scenarios that have been indicated during the workshops for the BRT/BRTZ sequestration project are named according to standards described by external literature (e.g. [ 6 ] , [ 8 ] ). The following scenarios were identified for assessment of the risks:
• Cap rock leakage
Step 5: Identification of mitigating measures Mitigation measures are defined in this note as 'measures undertaken to reduce the adverse likelihood and/or impact of hazards, environmental degradation and technological hazards'. The words mitigation measures and barriers are actually interchangeable in this paper. A mitigation measure is for instance the application of a pan-cake plug to prevent migration via the wells after the abandonment process. Also a monitoring plan is an example of a mitigation measure because it will allow you to take preventive actions to prevent migration or leakage and limit possible effects. Mitigation measures have to be taken for all medium and high leakage risk scenarios and might be needed for low risk scenarios. It has also to be shown that for those scenarios the effect of mitigation will reduce the risk to a negligible or low ranking and that the risks are ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable).
Step 6: Definition of acceptance criteria en test of the remaining risks against the criteria Acceptance criteria have to be defined in cooperation with the stakeholders. Discussions with the stakeholders can define or redefine also the quantitative definition of the word "reasonably" in ALARP. At this moment probabilities and/or quantities of leakage volumes haven't been agreed nor defined by the key stakeholder: the government but the EIA [ 3 ] was approved by the EIA commission. The project is designed for no leakage at any quantity. As well, a lack of clarity on acceptance criteria will also hinder the process of risk communication.
Step Figure 2 and fully documented in [ 4 ] . The main threats, the possible consequences, probabilities and monitoring and mitigation actions are presented for the fault leakage scenario valid for the injection phase only. Finally, the total consequence and impact per scenario is mapped into a risk matrix that pictures the ranking of the risks of the leakage scenarios in one overview that accompanies the tabulated risk management plan (Figure 3 ). There are two criteria that determine the probability of migration out of the containment: Initial integrity, Integrity of the system and specific (geological) barriers with respect to migration of CO 2 before the actual injection phase. The integrity of the storage system is proven by the geological containment of hydrocarbons in BRT and BRTZ. Possible gas migration is not spotted on seismic above or near the structures. Still, it might be possible that production related activities lead to geomechanical changes in and around the reservoir but above all, wells have been drilled that could create a direct leak path to the surface. Safety factor: The safety factor describes the 'distance' before a threshold related to the threat is released. For example the pressure difference between operational injection pressure and fracture pressure of the seal can be large or small. If the injection pressure is much lower than the fracture pressure of the seal, the safety factor is large for that specific threat. A thick overburden containing several reservoirs can also be seen as a large safety factor. The combination of all threat 'distances' in the scenario defines the final verdict on safety factor. The consequences are defined by the expected amount of migration, the possible surfacing of the CO 2 (leakage) and the vicinity of vulnerable objects. We consider for example the consequence to be low when the CO 2 might migrate but will be trapped by deep layers or that it can migrate up to the surface in low concentrations without doing harm. It is important to know what the effect will be of this assessment on the further steps in the risk management philosophy. The influence of the risk ranking on the mitigation option (risk treatment) is discussed below. Negligible risk scenarios: These risks are indicated by the blue colour in Figure 3 . Negligible risks do not require further monitoring. Low concentration means that it is within the uncertainty bounds of natural CO 2 occurrence and cannot be picked up by monitoring tools. Low risk scenarios: These risks are indicated by the green colour in Figure 3 . A high concentration means a relative high CO 2 concentration that can be picked by monitoring tools. Low risks implicate the need for monitoring of possible migration or the monitoring around vulnerable objects (drinking water, surface monitoring). According to the study work performed, BRT-1 and BRT-2b show a low to medium probability for migration out of the containment. Mitigation measures like a work-over of the wells lead to a significant reduction (negligible) of the risks pointed out by the arrows in Figure 3 . Still, it was decided to investigate as well the possible maximum leakage flux that could occur via a well. Calculations pointed out that the maximum annual emission from the leakage point was still below the annual CO 2 emission of a mid-sized car [ 10 ] . Medium risk scenarios: Medium risks are indicated by the orange colour in Figure 3 . Medium risks prescribe the monitoring of nearby sensitive objects and the monitoring of the main threats. Monitoring of the migration of CO 2 after the failure of the barrier is prescribed as well. No medium leakage risks have been identified for the BRT and BRTZ storage project. High risk scenarios: These risks, indicated by the red colour are not accepted within the project. Identified high risks need to be closed out by further study work or significantly reduced by mitigation measures. No high leakage risks have been identified for the BRT and BRTZ storage project. Step 8: Review of risk management plan Review of the plan by independent teams is an important step as the risk management plan impacts the whole project structure. Proposed actions by the review teams have to be closed out and endorsed. Endorsement supports confidence in the whole project that contributes to debates with the public. For BRT and BRTZ the risk management plan was challenged by local, regional and national governmental bodies. The management plan was also reflected in the environmental impact assessment (EIA) and challenged and endorsed by the EIA committee.
Risk
Step 9: Review & Update scenario sheets at pre-determined milestones and when new monitoring data becomes available During the execution of the project, the risk management plan has to be reviewed and possibly adapted at predefined moments during the operational phases and on the moments that new monitoring data become available. Also this step is a standard procedure in the industry. It is foreseen that an independent committee will have access to the monitoring data and will have the ability to comment on any deviation from expected behaviour. Predefined moments of monitoring and model control are inserted in the operational plans.
Step 10: Risk communication with the stakeholders and the public Probably the most important step for the application of a license to operate is the communication of the assessed and managed risks to stakeholders and public. The perception of the risks by the public can differ very much from the outcome of step 7. It is recommended that communication experts communicate the risk management plan to the public and not technical experts. This is only successful when full understanding on the risk management plan exists by the communication expert. More information on risk communication and public perception is given in [ 11 ] .
Containment demonstration after abandonment
The abandonment phase reviews long-term process such as pressure increase by gas mixing and long-term geochemical changes (re-mineralization). These threats were investigated using the same step-wise risk methodology. Containment after abandonment is demonstrated by the fact that the pressure in the reservoir will always be lower than the pore pressure in the rocks around the reservoir. Long-term mineralization will reduce the permeability of the seal, making the seal more sealing. To avoid any leakage via wells through buoyant forces, wells will be abandoned by using 'pan-cake' plugs. In this case steel, cement and some rock will be milled away over certain sections and these sections will subsequently be filled with CO 2 resistant cement. Soil and groundwater will be monitored after abandonment as well as ground movement. The duration of the post abandonment monitoring period is to be agreed with the government.
Conclusion
The risk management plan is designed to demonstrate and ensure permanent and safe containment of the CO 2 in BRT and BRTZ fields. It pictures the position of all the technical work in a coherent framework. Verdicts on the individual threats and leakage scenarios by experts further determine the monitoring and mitigation strategy of the BRT and BRTZ development plan, which can be labeled therefore as a risk based. The risk management plan shows that:
• No medium and high leakage scenarios have been identified in both the injection phase and post abandonment phase, • low risk scenarios in the injection phase were shifted to a negligible to low position by mitigating measures, • a risk-based monitoring and mitigation plan has been defined, • the risk for long-term leakage is negligible, • this framework is highly usable for future CO 2 storage projects.
